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1. Introduction
It is a commonplace that a new subject within a scholarly discipline - such as the law - tends to
suffer primarily from methodological problems. As long as these problems have not been solved,
or at least have been provided with an answer, regarded as satisfactory by most of the academics in
the field, it is difficult to come to the substance of the new subject. The recent development of the
emergence of a `European private law' is a good example of this phenomenon. On the one hand,
most private law scholars (and the same goes for European practitioners although they are not as
outspoken as their colleagues in the Universities) agree that some sort of harmonisation,
unification, or even codification of private law in Europe should be realised. They reason that a
truly single European market cannot properly function without a common private law. Private law
(in particular the law of contract) is after all the backbone of economic activity and if there are too
many differences between the legal systems of different countries, having for a consequence
uncertainty, this activity is severely hampered, even if the feelings of business partners are more of
a psychological nature than based on real differences.1 On the other hand, however, there is a
widespread disagreement about the way this new ius commune europaeum should be established.
This has led to an already vast amount of literature, concerned with this methodological question;2
compared to the few publications that are mainly concerned with substance,3 the emphasis on
methodology is striking. This is all to be explained from the common sense feeling that substance
is a risky business as long as there is no relative consensus on the methodology to come to
substance.
In this review essay, I will try to categorise the present attempts at creating a European
private law and critically discuss these attempts in the light of recent practical and theoretical
literature. There is every need to do this since the formerly rather narrow and `positivist' (namely
focusing on rules) discussion on European private law is now broadening very fast. Over the last
two years, theories inspired by sociology and cultural sciences,4 public law5 and legal theory itself6
                                        
1Jürgen Basedow, Un droit commun des contrats pour le marché commun, 50 Revue Internationale de droit comparé
(1998), 7 argues that psychological feelings about feared differences maybe more important then the existence of true
differences. Likewise, the psychological impact of a European Civil Code would be bigger then it is usually thought.
     2For an overview of literature in general on European private law see Ewoud Hondius, Towards a European Civil
Code, 2nd. ed., Nijmegen 1998, 3.
     3Cf. par. 2.3.1.
     4See in particular the writings of Pierre Legrand who, influenced by ideas from the cultural sciences and language
theory, has argued that a European Civil Code is not feasible (see par. 2.2.3).
     5Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3
European Law Journal (1997), 3.
     6See, e.g., Bert van Roermund, We, Europeans; On the Very Idea of a Common Market in European Community
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have enriched the discussion. Special attention is paid to two recent books by Basil Markesinis, one
concerning methodology and one concerning substance. This emphasis on Markesinis' views is
appropriate since he is one of the few authors who is able to show the results in practice of a more
or less worked out theory on (and methodology of) comparative law. The essay thus tries to
compare the present attempts at creating a European private law with the method, proposed by
Markesinis.
It is thus the European private law in the making7 that is discussed here. And although
some of the proponents of this possibly new ius commune refer to that period of time in which a
true ius commune did exist in Europe (mainly in the 17th and 18th century),8 there can be no doubt
about it that the road that has to be travelled is a new one. Present times can hardly be compared
with the cultural and legal climate in that time foregone, in which all lawyers spoke the same
language and were all part of one unified culture, let alone that private law rules were to a far
lesser extent imposed upon the nationals by states than has been the case since the great private law
codifications of the 19th and 20st century. So we really have to travel a road not travelled before.9
That makes the methodological questions even more difficult, but - of course - also far more
exciting. To use the language of the former ius commune: it is terra incognita and if a warning had
to be given before entering the area, it would probably be hic sunt leones, not only because of the
presence of the wasteland itself, but also because of the many authors that attempt to find their way
through it.
2. A Categorisation of Attempts to Create a European Private Law
2.1 A twofold distinction
How to tame the lions? A simple categorisation of the attempts to create a European private law
seems to be a good starting point. The categorisation presented here is based on the distinction
between state imposed and non-state imposed law. With state-imposed law I mean simply that it is
the official state organs (including those of the European Union) who ratione imperii impose the
law on their nationals (e.g. in Acts of Parliament) or (in the case of the EU), on the European
Member States or on the individual members thereof. These two ways of creating a European
private law have to be clearly distinguished, not to implement the discussion in a more or less
outdated positivistic framework, but for practical reasons. In the former situation, the discussion is
after all mainly concerned with questions of competence. Does the EU-Treaty create competence
for the European organs to implement a European Civil Code? If not, should such competence be
created?10 In the latter situation, questions of competence are far less important. Here, the emphasis
lies much more on a discussion on the many subtle ways a European private law can be created in
another way than through the enactment of a Code. Here, e.g., the discretion of the judiciary to use
comparative law arguments, or the role of the universities, should be discussed.
                                                                                                                                       
Law, in Law, Life and the Images of Man (Festschrift Broekman), Berlin 1996, 455; Mark van Hoecke, Mark
Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1998) 495; J.M. Smits, Eenheid en verscheidenheid in het
contractenrecht, 27 Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie (1998), 10.
     7Cf. H.C.F. Schoordijk, Enkele opmerkingen over de bronnen van verbintenis en `European law in the making',
Europees contractenrecht, Arnhem 1995, 95.
     8See in particular the many writings of Reinhard Zimmermann (referred to in note 55). Pierre Legrand, Against a
European Civil Code, 60 Modern Law Review (1997), at 58, rightly points out that this is a somewhat Romantic
presentation of reality since English law was not part of this ius commune.
     9cf. Legrand, 60 MLR (1997), 48.
     10These questions were widely discussed on a conference in The Hague in February 1997; see Martin Schmidt-
Kessel, 52 Juristenzeitung (1997), 1052; Winfried Tilmann, Towards a European Civil Code, 5 Zeitschrift für
Europäisches Privatrecht (1997), 595.
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2.2 A European private law by imposition
2.2.1 Unification through treaties and harmonisation through EU Directives
It does not come as a surprise that the traditional way of achieving uniformity, i.e. through binding
treaties between different countries, has not had much success in the field of private law. The need
for every country's agreement to the treaty makes it not very likely that hard and fast rules can be
formulated and it is not too bold to say that most of the substance of private law is not covered by
treaties. The presence of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980 and of treaties in
the field of bills of exchange and cheque law and of liability for damages caused by nuclear
activities and transportation law cannot convince me to reach another conclusion. And even where
ratification has taken place, problems of interpretation usually arise since mostly no mandatory
judicial procedure is provided. A uniform application of the treaty is then virtually impossible.11
The most widely used method of achieving a higher degree of uniformity between the
private law systems within the European Union has up till now been through Directives issued by
the European Union.12 Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved by the Member States
(art. 189 3 EEC-Treaty), while the form and method for implementing it can be chosen by the
Member State itself. Thus, harmonisation leads to a European `law of uniform results', be it that
the rules that bring these results about are national in character. The European Court of Justice can
not interpret these national rules, but it can interpret the Directive itself, bringing about uniformity
in the interpretation of the concepts in the Directive. Thus, private law can be harmonised, but
only in the field of rules deemed to be required for the establishment and functioning of the Single
Market (art. 100, 100A, 235 EEC-T).13 Family law, the law of inheritance and property law (cf.
art. 222 EEC-T14) are not considered to be necessary for the development of the Single Market,
meaning a competence does not exist; this has for a consequence that it is mainly the rules,
connected with the protection of the European citizen on the Single Market, that the Directives are
concerned with.15 So, Directives have been issued on, e.g., doorstepselling (1985), self-employed
commercial agents, consumer credit contracts (1986), package travel contracts (1990), unfair terms
in consumer contracts (1993)16, timesharing (1994) and - in the field of tort law - products liability
(1985).
But as wide the use of Directives in the field of private law has been over the last fifteen
years, as many disadvantages of this method of harmonisation have come to the surface. Firstly:
the emphasis on consumer protection as the motor of private law development within the European
Union has given the harmonisation process an only limited drive: Directives have resulted in
European private law for a very limited area, driven by `a feeling for actualities', as Müller-Graff
has recently called it.17 The result is `a Brussels brick here and there'.18
Secondly: the character of harmonization - the objectives are centrally formulated, but the
way in which they are attained are at the discretion of the Member States - also entails that the
Member States are responsible for bringing their law in line with the Directive. As a result of this
                                        
     11See Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Private Law Unification by Means other than of Codification, in Towards a
European Civil Code, 1st ed., Nijmegen 1994, 23. Other disadvantages of this method are evident, such as the very
complex private international law relationships that arise between countries that have and that have not ratified the
treaty.
     12See Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, EC Directives as a Means of Private Law Unification, in A.S. Hartkamp et al
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 2nd. ed., Nijmegen 1998, 71. A seven pages-list of Directives is presented
there.
     13Oliver Remien, Illusion und Realität eines europäischen Privatrechts, 47 Juristenzeitung (1992), 277.
     14See Steven Bartels, Europees privaatrecht: over de bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen Unie en Lid-Staat m.b.t. het
eigendomsrecht, 44 Ars Aequi (1995), 244.
     15Cf. Gerardo Broggini, Was bedeutet heute gemeineuropäisches Vertragsrecht? 38 Zeitschrift für
Rechtsvergleichung (1997), 221, at 223.
     16See the special issue of 5 European Review of Private Law (1997), 2.
     17Müller-Graff, Towards, 82.
     18Oliver Remien, `Über den Stil des Europäischen Privatrechts', 60 RabelsZ (1996), 8.
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embedding into national law, it is difficult to establish, after a Directive has been issued, whether
and to what extent implementation and judicial interpretation have left uniformity intact.19
Finally, and from a more dogmatic point of view: since private law is a system, the
introduction of one single Directive into that system may lead to the introduction of Fremdkörper,
by which not only the unification is not successful, but also the unity of the private law system
itself is endangered. I should add that, recently, Tonner20 and Micklitz21 have argued that this
argument against harmonisation is not to be taken too serious since these rules of European origin
(especially in the field of consumer law and company law) can play the role of precursors of a
future European private law. According to them, these new special rules will lead the way for the
general rules of classic private law in just the way commercial law led the way in the 19th century
for general private law. In my opinion, this leaves unanswered the problems as to how the unity of
the private law system should be solved during the transition period.
The making of a complete European Civil Code does - according to most authors and for
the reasons set out above - not belong to the competence of the European Union. Thus, most civil
law is under the principle of subsidiarity left to the Member States. Jürgen Basedow however has
recently argued that a European Civil Code in the field of contract law can be based on art. 100A
sqq. EEC-Treaty. This would mean that European contract law could be imposed upon the
Member States and their nationals by regulation.22 Of course, the political will to do so, should be
there and in my opinion it is not very likely that a majority could be reached regarding the
substance of the common rules. In any case, it is not too audacious to state that the call from the
European Parliament in 1989 and 1994 that a European Civil Code should be made,23 will not be
answered by the Commission in the near future.
2.2.2 A European private law through the judgments of the European Court of Justice and of
the European Court of Human Rights
Although in general not seen as an independent way of establishing a European private law, it
cannot be denied that in particular the activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
Luxemburg have contributed in the past and will probably even more contribute in the future to the
development of a European private law.24
Institutionally, the situation is clear. Directives that have been implemented in national law
have to be interpreted by the national courts in a way that is `Europe friendly' enough.25 The role
of the ECJ is to bring about uniformity in the interpretation of concepts of the Directive through
the preliminary ruling procedure of art. 177 EEC-T. Although the ECJ has thus in principle been
                                        
     19See, for instance, Müller-Graff, Towards, 1st ed., at 22 sqq. For other objections to harmonisation through
Directives see Kapteyn/Verloren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the EC, 2nd ed., Deventer, 1989, 478.
     20Klaus Tonner, Die Rolle des Verbraucherrechts bei der Entwicklung eines europäischen Zivilrechts, 51
Juristenzeitung 1996, 533.
     21Hans-W. Micklitz, Perspektiven eines Europäischen Privatrechts, 6 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht
(1998), 253, at 263.
     22Of course, in the end it is a question of political will and not so much of litteral interpretation of the EC Treaty.
Basedow, Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1998), 7  For an overview of elder (German) literature see Christian
Armbrüster, Ein Schuldvertragsrecht für Europa?, 60 RabelsZ (1996), 72.
     23Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member States, O.J. EC 1989 C 158/400;
Resolution on the Harmonization of Certain Sectors of the Private Law of the Member States, O.J. EC 1994 C
205/518. On the second resolution: Winfried Tilmann, Zweiter Kofifikationsbeschluss des Europäischen Parlaments, 3
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (1995), 534.
     24Walter van Gerven, ECJ Case-law as a Means of Unification of Private Law?, in 5 European Review of Private
Law (1997), 293 and reprinted in Towards, 2nd. ed., 91.
     25See for this `Europafreundliche Auslegung' Christian von Bar, Vereinheitlichung und Angleichung von
Deliktsrecht in der Europäischen Union, 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (1994), 221, at 231; cf. Stefan
Grundmann, Richtlinienkonforme Auslegung im Bereich des Privatrechts, 4 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht
(1996), 399.
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given an important instrument to unify in those fields of law that have been covered by Directives,
practice is different. Van Gerven has recently pointed out that the ECJ's case law concerning the
interpretation of Directives is, compared to the interpretation of the Treaty itself, not very
audacious, but rather of a textual nature.26 The Court's contribution to unify law by this interpre-
tation method has up till now been rather modest.27
In another way, the contribution of the Court of Justice to the development of a ius
commune has been more important, namely in the field of tort law. As is well known, in the
Francovich case,28 the Court has established that a Member State that has not implemented a
Directive at all, is liable in tort for the damage caused to the plaintiff, provided some specific
requirements have been satisfied (e.g. that the Directive intended to grant rights to individuals and
that the contents of these rights could be determined). In the Brasserie case,29 the Court stated that
State liability does also exist where directly effective Treaty provisions have been violated. The
unifying effect of these cases is clear: national rules that are incompatible with these judgments
cannot any longer be part of the national legal system. The new rules replace pre-existing and
diverging national provisions.30 Moreover, a beginning of uniform interpreting concepts like harm
and causation is there.31 Of course, the real breakthrough would be if the ECJ would affirm a
remedy should be available for breaches of Community law by individuals.
In other fields of private law than tort law, the role of the ECJ has been modest. So, for
instance, in the field of contract law. As one of the reasons for this, as Van Gerven has pointed
out,32 is to be mentioned that art. 215 EEC-T states that matters of contractual liability of the
Community shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in question; the ECJ does thus
not feel compelled to search for common principles. Nevertheless should I make mention of one
important judgment of the ECJ in the field of company law, but with effects for general contract
law. In the Marleasing case,33 the ECJ has set aside the requirement of causa for the valid
formation of (at least some types of) contract on the basis that in the Directive 68/151 among the
grounds for voidness of the (contract to found a) company, causa was not mentioned. This case is -
as Bassoni and Mincke have showed - not only of significance for Spanish law, but also for other
countries where causa still is an official requirement for formation of contract.34
This overview of attempts to create a ius commune would not be complete without mentio-
ning the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This contribution has
up till now been the most important in the field of European family law, where, e.g., many discri-
minating national rules have been set aside on the ground of Art. 8 European Convention of
Human Rights (protection of family life)35 and in the field of civil procedure.36 Potentially of great
importance in the field of property law is Art. 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, protecting every
person's `peaceful enjoyment of his possessions'. The ambit of this provision has up till now been
                                        
     26Van Gerven, 5 ERPL (1997), 295.
     27See Van Gerven, 5 ERPL (1997), at 304, for an example of a possible unifying interpretation of `good faith' in
art. 3 of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 1993.
     28Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 [1991] ECR I-5357. On Francovich see W. van Gerven, Bridging the Unbridgeable, 45
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1996), 507 and M.H. Wissink, Sociaal Economisch Weekblad 1997, 78.
     29Cases C-46/93 and C 48/93 [1996] ECR I-1029.
     30Maria Luisa Fernandez Esteban, National Judges and Community Law: The Paradox of the Two Paradigms of
Law, 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1997), 146, also on the birth of a ius commune.
     31Van Gerven, 5 ERPL (1997), 300. As far as the liability of the Community institutions and its civil servants (and
not of the States themselves) is concerned, art. 215 EEC-T explicitly states that liability exists `in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States'.
     32Cf. Van Gerven, 5 ERPL (1997), 301, also for other reasons.
     3313 November 1990, C-106/89 (Marleasing SA/La Comercial).
     34Vittoria Bassoni, Wolfgang Mincke, Europa sine causa? 5 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht  (1997), 599.
     35For an overview: Dieter Martiny, Is Unification of Family Law Feasible or Even Desirable? in Towards, 151.
     36Cf. for an overview of case law on the basis of art. 6 ECHR (fair trial) Konstantinos Kerameus, Procedural
Implications of Civil Law Unification, in Towards, 130.
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rather unclear;37 the article might however very well become of importance in future cases, in
particular in countries where national constitutional review is not allowed (as is for instance the
case in The Netherlands). It goes without saying that the development of a ius commune in this way
can only be fragmentary and slow.
2.2.3 Pierre Legrand and the Contrarian Challenge
Overlooking these attempts to create a European ius commune through a classic State oriented
method, the result is not encouraging for those who have put their hopes on the official State (or
European Union) institutions. Leaving aside the very improbable unification by way of treaty, the
remaining methods can only be characterised as fragmentary; for the issuing of an entire Code,
competence of the European Union seems to be lacking under the principle of subsidiarity,
although if the political will is there, this problem could be overcome. But then another problem
arises. Even if a European Civil Code could be made, the question is to be raised whether it will be
successful in the sense that it does really have a unifying effect. Here, I should make mention of
the work of Pierre Legrand,38 who has eloquently argued that a European Civil Code is not
feasible.
Inspired by cultural studies and modern philosophy and sociology, Legrand takes as a
starting point that merely drafting uniform rules does not result in uniform law. Law is, after all,
much more than just formally uniformed rules: the meaning of a particular rule in a particular
cultural and national context can only be established after studying that context. And this context,
the legal mentalité, differs between the various cultures.39 According to Legrand, the mentalités are
even irreconcilable in the case of continental and English law. Epistemologically, the reasoning in
common law is inductive with an emphasis on facts and legal precedent; in civil law the focus is on
systematization.40 Whereas civilian lawyers try to fit a legal decision into a logical system, Anglo-
American jurists abhor formal rules and consciously choose to counteract continental Civilian
influence. This choice derives from unbridgeable cultural differences. Legrand has put forward
some other arguments as well: the whole idea of a European codification is arrogant in his view,
because it imposes on common lawyers the supposedly superior world view of continental lawyers.
They each offer different accounts of reality and those preaching codification of private law
consider the Anglo-American reality as without merit. A European Civil Code is only in the
interests of the European economy and consequently cultural differences must disappear.41
Furthermore, the suggestion that Europe will return to a Golden Age of a true ius commune is
misleading, because English law was never part of it. All this has led Legrand to the conclusion
that `legal systems (...) have not been converging, are not converging and will not be conver-
ging.'42 What the comparatist should do, is engage in activities to meet the `contrarian challenge'.
This approach43
`commits the comparatist to a critical or subversive vocation through the denunciation of any impression suggesting
that the law's precepts somehow have an autonomous existence in the sense that they would be self-constituting. No
                                        
     37see Francis G. Jacobs, Robin C.A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd. ed., Oxford 1996,
246.
     38Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
(1996), 52; Sens et non-sens d'un Code Civil Européen, Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1996), 779; Against a
European Civil Code, 60 Modern Law Review (1997), 45.
     39Legrand, 45 ICLQ (1996), at 60, cf. 60 MLR (1997), at 59: `jus is not reducible to lex'.
     40Legrand 45 ICLQ (1996), at 74; 60 MLR (1997), at 46 sqq.
     41Cf. Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 MLR (1995), 262, at 272: `must
we accept that legal culture be made subservient to the ethos of capital and technology in an instrumental and
ahistoricist re-invention of Europe?'
     42Legrand, 45 ICLQ (1996), at 61-62.
     43Pierre Legrand, Buchbesprechung of Bernard Grossfeld, Kernfragen der Rechtsvergleichung, 62 RabelsZ (1998),
315-316.
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matter how much a text may project an image of completeness or definitiveness or intemporality or self-governance
(and irrespective of how much this autonomy may be wanted by lawyers), in fact a text is always overdetermined, or
constituted by, the culture or tradition which it inhabits'.
In my opinion, Legrands views can be criticised on the ground that his arguments are not
so much directed against a European private law, but much more against a Code that is imposed by
State authority.44 But the lion's share of Legrand's argumentation is to the point. It cannot be
denied that a legal rule can only be understood as part of the culture it is part of and as long as
there is no truly European (legal) culture,45 divergences will not disappear. Basedow46 has argued
that, although there are differences between the various legal cultures, there also exists something
of this European legal culture. I will not go into this debate; it is, however, crystal clear that there
still are characteristic differences between legal systems in the field of history, method, legal
sources, ideology, judicial style, language,47 etc.48
I have argued in a previous article49 that because of the methodological problems Legrand
has embarked upon, we should abstain from making a European private law by imposition, but
should concentrate on other methods. A caveat however should be given: one could be inclined to
think that the non-State imposed methods of coming to a ius commune50 have nothing to do with a
political will to create one. I would consider this as a fallacy: the national States or the European
Union could very well be proponents of a European private law, at the same time not intervening
to create one. The `voluntary creation' can take different forms; three of these are to be discussed
underneath.
2.3 A European private law by voluntary creation
2.3.1 Legal Science and Legal Education
The first method to be discussed here is the creation of a European private law by legal science and
legal education.51 Its adherents assert that just like the ius commune of the 17th and 18th century
was a legal system, primarily made at the Universities, a new ius commune should find its origin
there as well. Departing from that starting point, students could be raised in a European legal
fashion and practitioners could benefit from the comparative legal material, made available to them
by scholars. Thus, it would be by `reception' that in the end a ius commune europaeum will
emerge.52 The one author who would deserve a separate treatment for that matter, is Reinhard
Zimmermann. In his many (partly programmatic) writings, he has emphasised that53
`the essential prerequisite for a truly European private law would appear to be the emergence of an "organically
                                        
     44See J.M. Smits, Een Europees privaatrecht als gemengd rechtsstelsel, 73 Nederlands Juristenblad (1998), 61
(published as A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System in 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law (1998); Legrand himself would probably not agree on this; cf. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of `Legal
Transplants', 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1997), 111.
     45If a uniform European (legal) culture would exist, Legrands objections could be overcome. In Legrands view
however, `the understanding of diversity' is indispensable because of the incommensurability across legal traditions (60
MLR (1997), 62).
     46Jürgen Basedow, Rechtskultur - zwischen nationalen Mythos und europäischem Ideal, 3 Zeitschrift für
Europäisches Privatrecht (1996), 379. See for criticism on Legrand also Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith
in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 Modern Law Review (1998), 11.
     47Pierre Pescatore, Recht in einem mehrsprachigen Raum, 6 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (1998), 1
argues however that in the end only two legal cultures (civil law and common law) exist.
     48cf. Oliver Remien, Über den Stil des europäischen Privatrechts, 60 RabelsZ (1996), 1.
     49Smits, 73 NJB (1998), 61.
     50Cf. Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 56 RabelsZ (1992), 215.
     51Cf. Axel Flessner, Rechtsvereinheitlichung durch Rechtswissenschaft und Juristenausbildung, 56 RabelsZ (1992),
243.
     52Cf. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd. ed., Oxford 1998, v.
     53David L. Carey Miller and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law, Berlin 1997, 293.
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progressive" legal science, which would have to transcend the national boundaries and to revitalize a common
tradition'.
The magnificent merit of Zimmermann is that he has not halted at this programmatic statement, but
has shown us how legal scholarship can attribute to the coming into being of a European private
law. Of the utmost importance have been his publications on the so-called `mixed legal systems'.
One of the major problems in a ius commune would after all be the `mixing' of civil law and
common law elements; for that matter, we can draw inspiration from the legal systems where this
has already been done. Especially the experience in South-Africa and in Scotland is consequently of
great importance for the future development of European private law.54
Allow me to make two remarks on the method of `ius commune through legal science'.
First, it should be noted that regarding the historical argument that a ius commune has existed in
the past and can serve as a model to us now, legal historians are not unanimous. On the contrary,
the argument is so controversial that two schools of thought have developed. On the one hand, the
adherents of `Neohistorismus' claim that we should try to study the legal past with no other
purpose than the pure pursuit of knowledge. Studying the long history of private law gives us no
clue whatsoever as to its future development, even if a ius commune has existed in the past.55 On
the other hand, the adherents of `Neopandektismus' argue that there has been a ius commune and
that it can serve as an example on the winding road to a European private law.56 Without trying to
solve this controversy, I should say that - thinking along the lines Hoetink has set out57 - it is
impossible to look objectively to the past and that it is many times fruitful to abuse the past for
present purposes. So, even if we use the former ius commune in a somewhat unscientific way, it
can serve a purpose.
Secondly, it is worth noticing that in this view, the role of legal science in the common law
should be very different from the role it has had in the past. Indeed, in European continental law,
legal scholars have always been the forerunners, developing a dogmatic system where practice can
benefit from. English law however has been much more practice oriented and not so willing to
accept scholarly insights in the solving of cases. Although there are signs that in English law, one
is more and more inclined to think along continental lines,58 a true change of mentalité has not yet
taken place. With so different mentalities in civil law and common law, it makes it difficult to
believe that legal science can play the role in England it plays on the Continent.
What have been the scholarly efforts so far ? Apart from the classic book by Zweigert and
Kötz,59 in which the national systems are compared on the basis of legislation and cases without the
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Rechtskundig Weekblad (1996), 1430.
     57H.R. Hoetink, Les Notions Anachroniques dans l'Historiographie du Droit, in Opera Selecta, Zutphen 1986, 216.
I have used this argument before in J.M. Smits, De noodzaak en de mogelijkheid van rechtsvergelijking in het civiele
recht, Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie 6154 (1994), 728.
     58See, e.g., Peter Birks (ed.), The Classification of Obligations, Oxford 1997, where it is argued that the more
intuitively determined common law classification should make place for a taxonomy.
     59The translation of the 3rd. German edition (1996) has been published in 1998: Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz,
An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd. ed., Oxford 1998.
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ambition to try to draft common rules for political purposes and apart from Markesinis' book to be
reviewed underneath, three recent books should be mentioned.60 Kötz has published volume I of a
textbook on European Contract Law; the second volume by Flessner is forthcoming.61 In Kötz'
book, it is explicitly admitted that before a European Civil Code can be successful, the way
lawyers think should be `Europeanised'. Kötz writes that `all that is needed to constitute European
private law is to recognise it' and that can be brought about by having books which disregard
national boundaries in order to show us the common principles, and an education of lawyers in the
European ius commune (preface). Secondly, a revised and expanded edition of Towards a European
Civil Code has been published in 1998.62 The 37 authors have been asked not to discuss the
feasability of a European Common law, but to adress directly the substantial matter of the possible
content of common rules.
Separate mention should be made of the publication of Christian von Bar's Gemeineu-
ropäisches Deliktsrecht in 1996.63 In this `ganz normales Lehr- und Handbuch' (as the author calls
it himself; it is much more than that), the rules of tort in the codified systems and in the
Scandinavian and Common law systems are considered: a description of the positive law is
constantly supplemented by Von Bar's own comments. His aim is to discover common principles,
without, however, abstaining from national particularities. Whether a European Code should be
made on the basis of comparative study, is `cura posterior' (Vorwort) and according to him not the
most important venture to be undertaken at the moment.64
Apart from textbooks in which European private law is presented in one way or another, at
least four projects aim at trying to develop principles of European private law. The establishment
of principles seems indeed to be one of the most promising ways to develop a ius commune, as
many authors have already emphasised.65 Apart from the Lando project on contract law, to be
discussed underneath, I should mention three projects. The first is the Casebooks for the Common
Law of Europe project under the general editorship of Walter van Gerven. This projects aim is `to
help uncover the common roots of the different legal systems, not to unify them. In other words, to
strengthen the common legal heritage of Europe, not to strangle its diversity'.66 This is done by
presenting factual situations with their various solutions under different legal systems (mainly those
of England, France and Germany) in casebooks inspired by the American model. Casebooks on
Tort Law, Contracts, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Corporations are envisaged.
The casebooks are designed to be of use as teaching material in the Universities of (mainly)
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     61Hein Kötz, European Contract Law, Vol. I, Oxford 1997 (the English translation of Europäisches Vertragsrecht,
I, Tübingen 1992); reviewed by E.A. Kramer, 62 RabelsZ (1998), 524; Part 2 has been partly published as Axel
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     62A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 2nd. ed., Nijmegen 1998.
     63Erster Band, München 1996, reviewed by Tony Weir, 5 European Review of Private Law (1997), 433. Vol. 2 on,
e.g., causation and the relationship between liability and insurance will be published later on. An English translation of
the book will be published by OUP. Preliminary work was done in Christian von Bar, Deliktsrecht in Europa, Köln
1993.
     64cf. Von Bar, ZfRV 1994, 221.
     65Reiner Schulze, Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze und europäisches Privatrecht, 1 Zeitschrift für Europäisches
Privatrecht (1993), 442; W. van Gerven, Naar een Europees gemeen recht van algemene rechtsbeginselen? 156 RM
Themis (1995), 233.
     66Foreword to Walter van Gerven et al (eds.), Torts; Scope of Protection, Oxford 1998, v. (this volume is published
as one of 8 chapters of the Casebook on tort law). See also W. van Gerven, Casebooks for the common law of Europe;
Presentation of the project, 4 European Review of Private Law (1996), 67 at 69: aim is not to create uniform rules (as
in the Lando project), but to find similar solutions and rules in the existing laws.
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Western and Eastern Europe.
The second project to be mentioned here is the Trento Common Core Project, initiated by
Ugo Mattei and Mauro Bussani. Inspired by the work of Schlesinger on formation of contract in
the 1960's,67 a rather large group of comparative lawyers from (mostly) European countries have
united to seek the common core of the bulk of European private law in the fields of contract, tort
and property. National reporters from the different EU countries design their national reports on
the basis of questionnaires for different topics, made by the general editors (e.g. Good Faith
(Zimmermann and Whittaker), Pure Economic Loss (Palmer and Bussani), Security in Movable
Property (Storme)).68 From a methodological point of view the Trento project is interesting. The
initiativetakers have explicitly considered the problem of cultural diversity and a possible unifying,
`culture killing', effect of the results projects like these entail:69
`We do not wish to force the actual diverse reality of the law within a map to reach uniformity. We are not drafting
acity plan for something that will develop in the future and that we wish to affect. We are neutral in front of future
developments. This project only seeks to describe the present complex situation in a reliable way. While we believe that
cultural diversity in the law is an asset, we do not wish to take a preservationist approach. Nor we wish to push in the
direction of uniformity'.
This is indeed a substantial cultural difference between this project and the one, initiated by the
Lando Commission (see underneath), that is concerned with the future.
The third project I make mention of is undertaken by a group of scholars in the area of tort
law, usually referred to as the `Vienna-Tilburg Group'. On the basis of eight cases (`the Tilburg
hypotheticals'), to be answered by scholars from eleven European countries and the United States,
different outcomes in different jurisdictions are revealed. Furthermore, some general questions
concerning, e.g., liability and insurance are discussed.70 The philosophy behind this project is to
consider some fundamental issues of tort law in order to `shed new lights on choices made in our
own legal systems' and to `contribute to the reflection on, and further development of, all legal
systems'.71 This, of course, is the `classic' goal of comparative law; the Group envisages however
also the formulation of European Principles of Tort Law, to be derived on the basis of the
aforementioned activities.
These scholarly attempts to discover common Principles of European private law are (up
till now) all characterised by the fact that they are non-political: the result of the comparative
research is not laid down in concise rules, designed after the model of a Civil Code. In this respect,
the method differs from the one, to be discussed underneath.
2.3.2 Soft Law as a Model: the Lando Principles
A method that has been given a lot of scholarly interest over the last three years or so, is the
creation of a ius commune by drafting `principles.' The Commission on European Contract Law,
initiated by Ole Lando in the 1970's, has done so for the law of contract and has published part 1
of the Principles in 1995.72 What is interesting from a methodological point of view, is the use that
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     70The results so far have been laid down in two books: J. Spier (ed.), The Limits of Liability, The Hague 1996 and J.
Spier (ed.), The Limits of Expanding Liability, The Hague 1998.
     71Jaap Spier and Olav Haazen, Preliminary Observations, The Limits of Expanding Liability, 5-6.
     72Ole Lando, Hugh Beale (eds.), The Principles of European Contract Law, Part 1, Dordrecht 1995. Part 2 will
probably be published in 1998. Cf. Ole Lando, Is codification needed in Europe? 1 European Review of Private Law
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could be made of these Principles as a means of creating a European private law. Their most
important function for that matter is that they can serve as a model: they are soft law, representing
an ideal that is to be reached.73 The Principles could inspire legislators, (arbitral) courts and
contracting parties because of their persuasive authority.74 As the best of all European legal systems
is supposedly laid down in these Principles - they have been characterised as `European lex
mercatoria'75 - the inspiration that could be drawn from these could indeed be important. It is most
likely that if a national rule of contract law were to be interpreted in a `European' way, the
Principles could lead the way in doing so.76
I will not dwell here upon the rapidly changing climate concerning the possible function of
the Lando Principles. In the initial stages of the Principles project, they were not intended to create
uniform law, as now a general feeling seems to be emerging that the Principles (or an amended
version of these) could be incorporated into a future Civil Code.77 As set out above in par. 2.2.1,
the question of competence is triggered once more by this tendency.
2.3.3 The Comparative Law and Economics Approach
Finally, let me make mention of an approach to come to a ius commune that is inspired by the Law
and Economics movement. Taking as a point of departure the importance legal transplants (i.e. the
borrowing of legal institutions and rules by one country from another) have had for the develop-
ment of private law, the so-called Comparative Law and Economics approach seeks the reason for
a transplant in economic efficiency. Only efficient rules are allegedly transplanted. Ugo Mattei78 for
instance regards the reception of legal rules as the result of a competition, in which each legal
system provides different rules for the resolution of a specific problem. In a `market of legal
culture', where rule suppliers seek to satisfy demand, ultimately, the most efficient rule will prove
to be the winner.79 Of course, as it is a rule of law and economics that a correct choice can only be
made if all necessary information is available, one should be familiar with all the legal rules since
otherwise it will not be possible for the most efficient rule to come out on top. History shows us
many examples of the success of efficient legal transplants: e.g., rules on contract law have in the
19th century been exported by Germany to the common law world, nowadays many Anglo-
American institutions (trust, lease, etc.) are borrowed by countries on the Continent.
Given the usefulness of this analysis, one could leave it to the legislature to codify the most
efficient rule (as is propagated by Mattei).80 My point of view however81 would be that it should be
left to practice itself to find out what rule is to be used. If this rule has come out on top, it should
be regarded as the best one for that period of time, leaving open the possibility that another rule
could replace the previous one if practice would require so. This flexible approach would be
impossible if the efficient rule was codified.
                                                                                                                                       
Commercial Contracts, Irvington NY 1994.
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3. Markesinis' comparative approach
3.1 General Introduction
As said before, I will pay special attention to the views brought forward by Basil Markesinis in two
recent books. The first book, Foreign Law and Comparative Methodology, is a collection of
nineteen previously published articles, all written between 1978 and 1997, and a new introductory
chapter, entitled the same as the book itself, in which the author tries to summarise the themes he
has elaborated over the last twenty years. The second book, The Law of Contracts and Restitution:
a Comparative Introduction, is a textbook in which German and English law are compared and of
which Markesinis is the co-author. The overall theme of both books can be shortly summarised as
persuading English lawyers (be they students, academics, practitioners or judges) of the benefits
which are to be derived from comparative legal studies. It does thus not come as a surprise to find
in the first book articles with such titles as The Comparatist (or a Plea for a Broader Legal
Education),82 Il Ruola Della Giurisprudenza Nella Comparazione Giuridica,83 Bridging Legal
Cultures84 and Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Common Lawyer Looks at Some
Judgments of the German Federal Court.85 Other articles include Markesinis' classic study on causa
and consideration86 and some more recent publications on privacy and on tort law.
For the aim, Markesinis has set himself, he seems to have had the ideal qualifications from
the outset. He was a law student in continental Europe and for many years a lecturer in the
common law world (mainly England) and has thus been influenced by scholars and practitioners
from both the civil law and common law world (a list of those who influenced Markesinis' legal
mind - most of them comparative lawyers themselves - can be found on p. ix of Foreign law and
Comparative Methodology). This goes with a profound personal belief in the benefits of comparati-
ve law study (already his thesis from 1972 was devoted to a subject of comparative (public) law87).
This does not mean Markesinis has not written on classic private law (he has been the co-author of
two textbooks on tort law88 and agency89), but - as he has said himself - his `real work' lies in the
(comparative law) themes he tries to develop in his articles. I should say that his two comparative
introductions to German law90 are then somewhere in the middle since they contain the elaboration
in substance of the methodology of his articles. To make this survey complete, I should add that it
has not only been through his writing that Markesinis has tried to reach his aim, but also through
the establishment of two institutes, one in Leiden (where he has been a professor since the 1980's),
devoted to the study of Anglo-American law, and one in Oxford (where Markesinis became a
professor in 1996 after many years in the University of London), devoted to European law.
3.2 The main themes of Markesinis'writings
The main themes of Markesinis' work - as described by himself in the methodology book (p. 3) -
are fivefold. All of these themes lead the way to the very heart of the problems of modern
comparative law, but the continental reader should bear in mind that transplanting these themes to
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other European countries than England cannot be done without any problem. This is in particular
true for the first theme, to be summarised as the creation of an audience for the subject of
comparative law. This, indeed, has always been more difficult in England than it was in the rest of
Europe. Markesinis points out that in England studying law was always seen as a preparation for a
profession and because in that profession, there was no need for comparative law, students were
not interested. I must add that on the continent, where law was (and still is) much more seen as a
science, the call for comparative law study was usually bigger (although this should not be
exaggerated91).
The capital question, of course, is how the comparison between legal systems is to be made
if one wants to create an audience as big as possible. One must show his audience the advantages
of comparing legal systems. Markesinis claims that the case law method provides the lecturer with
so many advantages that this method should be regarded as the best. At least three advantages can
be listed (p. 4-5). Firstly, students of foreign law feel comfortable in a factual environment they
recognise. If the results in different countries are the same, they will lose their scepticism towards
foreign law and will become enthousiastic about its use for national practice. Secondly, by using
cases, one is able to put the concepts aside and to try `to discover the real but unexpressed policy
issues' (and thus similarities) that lie behind the factual situations (p. 4). To examine a system by
only looking at its concepts, would not be very fruitful. And thirdly, one is able to bridge the gap
between civil law and common law in this `functionalist' approach.
The results Markesinis is able to reach by working with the case method in not only the
articles in the methodology book, but in particular in his comparative textbook (written with two
German colleagues), are impressive. Before I say something about these results, let me first
introduce the textbook. It has already been described as `enormously useful'92 and as `formida-
ble,'93 and indeed it is. In nearly 1000 pages, and after a general introduction to German private
law (on the history and structure of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch and the principles of German
contract law94), eight subjects are discussed in eight different chapters on formation of contract, the
policing of contract, relaxations of contractual privity, the performance of contract, irregularities of
performance, good faith, remedies and restitution. Each chapter consists out of a commentary on
the subject, followed by (translated) cases (up to a total of 141), decided upon by German courts.
Appendixes contain translated extracts from the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch and the Allgemeine
Geschäftsbedingungen-Gesetz and a Glossary of German legal Terms. A Table of Cases and an
Index are indispensable.
In his preface to the textbook, Markesinis points out that it is designed as an introductory
work, mainly aimed at students; if practitioners would use it, he would regard it as `an extra
bonus'. This is very modest and not entirely in line with Markesinis' views on the importance of
exchange of ideas between different legal systems (see below). Methodologically interesting is that
Markesinis deliberately uses one of the classic fallacies of comparative law as a way to describe
German law. In classic comparative law theory, one is warned to describe foreign law as objective-
ly as possible, given one's own national legal and cultural heritage.95 But an objective description is
not what Markesinis aims at: he aims at the `anglicization' of German law, i.e. `to present the
information it contains about German law in a way that is intelligible to and usable by Common
lawyers' (preface). This implies that in his commentary, the author shows how a German case
would be solved in English law and vice versa. The author first had to deconstruct German law
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(organised through Pandectist structuralism) and then had to reconstruct it along common law
lines! In my opinion, this leads to very remarkable results in the chapters on, e.g., policing the
contract and remedies: the German Pandectist influence has been rather large in these fields of
study and as Markesinis describes these subjects for the reader who has been trained in the
Pandectist tradition, it is not only as if one understands German and English law better,96 but also
as if one is `submerged in an oxygen bath'.97 The advantages of this method culminate in the
chapter on the principle of good faith (p. 510 sqq). It is nearly impossible to make a common law
lawyer aware of the meaning good faith has in continental law; Markesinis however seems to
succeed as he starts his commentary with the thoughts that come to the mind of an Anglo-American
lawyer when he is confronted with the concept of `good faith'. By discussing these thoughts, the
author is able to give an excellent survey of the role good faith plays in German law.
I must admit that my sympathy lies very much with Markesinis' `anglicising' method since
it contributes in a very down to earth manner to the exchange of legal rules and ideas from one
country to another: common law students and practitioners do not have to go into the German way
of thinking, but the possible assets of looking at German law have already been made clear for the
common law world; all they have to do, is pick up the markers Markesinis has left.
If some criticism would have to be given however, it would be that Markesinis' method is
only right in a very practical sort of way; from a pure scholarly point of view, many fallacies of
the functionalist approach come to the surface. Legrand for example would object that to use cases
as `springboards into the ever-deeper waters of a foreign culture' (preface of The Law of Contract
and Restitution) by deconstructing them first and reconstructing them then along common law
lines, would be to `terrorise' German law.98 According to Legrand, German and English law are
`two discrete epistemological formations':99 characteristic for English law would be its suppressing
the search for a single determinate rationalisable order, as German law is characterised by
promoting such an order. Legrand asserts, these mentalités are irreducibly different: to transplant
legal rules from one mentalité to the other, is to destroy the very essence of that rule. On this
point, I would have been curious to know what Markesinis' opinion about Legrands objections
would have been. Of course, Markesinis' methodology is mainly worked out by `just doing it', not
by theoretical elaborations, but as Legrand's objections are also directed at the practice of
comparative law, I feel Markesinis should comment on these. In my opinion, Markesinis stands
midway between the two evils, so eloquently described by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who once
wrote that the study of civil law `tends to encourage a dangerous reliance (...) on glittering
generalities' whereas the case method encourages `the exhaustive analysis of a particular case with
which the common law begins and ends'.100 Markesinis brilliantly shows how the generalities and
the cases can be mixed.
As we return to the survey of Markesinis' themes, the second theme to be mentioned here,
is an `ideological belief' in Europe (p. 6). Not only is it Markesinis' purpose to emphasise
similarities rather than differences between the various European legal systems by teaching through
the case law method. He also admits that on the background of this `legal' goal, he has a firm
belief in European unity, perhaps not consisting in European uniformity, but then, at least, in
`mutual understanding and respect as well as an awareness that we have more things that unite us
than we have that divide us' (p. 7). By proclaiming this belief in Europe, Markesinis has given his
method a political goal; this leaves unaffected that one does not have to believe in European unity
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to defend the method Markesinis propagates.
The third theme can be described as the promotion of a comparative law approach, not
only by using the case law method in the universities, but also by directly attracting the attention of
the judges and by convincing them of the advantages of relying on foreign law in their
judgments.101 This strategy is typically English: after all, in England, not the academics but the
judges are the `senior partners' of the law-making process (p. 7). It could very well be that this
makes it even more difficult to attain this goal. The author writes that a true change of mentality in
legal England is needed for that matter; and since mentality is a `human' thing, Markesinis has
through his writings tried to persuade English lawyers to overcome the mentality block and to get
interested in what happens abroad.102 The success of this approach became evident when the House
of Lords used foreign material in White v. Jones.103 In the leading opinion of Lord Goff of
Chieveley, references were made to Lorenz, Kötz and Markesinis and to, e.g., German and Dutch
case law. This approach of attaining a European private law through the movement of ideas (p.
201), in other words by propagating that judges draw interpretive inspiration (p. 207) from foreign
law, is also in my opinion very attractive. It is not only a method that gives supremacy to practice
in creating a ius commune, from a theoretical point of view `terrorising' the other legal system's
mentalité is impossible since the importing judges themselves decides to what extent foreign law is
introduced. Of course, an internationalistic mentality would have to emerge, but on the whole
Markesinis is optimistic about that, although there are signs that `culture, tolerance, and universa-
lism' are under serious threat (p. 30).
The two final themes of Markesinis' work - in my view less important to characterise it -
are the ambition to look at law in a broader context and to challenge widely-held assumptions.
Under this heading, Markesinis' ambition to benefit from the historical-comparative approach as
practiced in Germany by civil lawyers like Zimmermann, should be mentioned. It implies that he
has not confined himself to the mere study of comparative law, but has involved legal history in his
work as well.104 In his articles about insurance aspects of tort law and the litigation practice in
England, Germany and the United States (also reprinted in the book on methodology), Markesinis
has embarked upon the use of statistical material to better understand differences and similarities
between various legal systems.
To me, it is without much doubt that Markesinis has shown us in the two books under
review one of the most promising ways towards a ius commune europaeum. It is, when all is said
and done, a fruitful approach to the borrowing of legal rules from other legal systems, or, to put it
another way, a method of having yourself inspired by foreign law, regardless what branch of the
law you are in.
                                        
     101See, in particular, The Destructive and Constructive Role of the Comparative Lawyer (at 36 sqq.), an article that
is very representative for the book.
     102This `spirit of open-mindedness and internationalism' (p. 195), Markesinis has tried to bring about, not only by
writing articles, but also by editing B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Gradual Convergence, Oxford 1994 (reviewed by Nigel
Foster, 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1995), 243).
     103White and another v. Jones and another [1995] 2 WLR 187.
     104cf. p. 26: `the past often explains what may otherwise be obscure in the present'.
